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Abstract
Animals show impulsiveness when they prefer a smaller more immediate option, even though a larger more delayed
option produces a higher intake rate. This impulsive behavior has implications for several behavioral problems including social cooperation. This paper presents two experiments using captive blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that consider the effects of payoff accumulation and temporal clumping on impulsiveness and cooperation. Payoff accumulation refers to a situation where the benefits gained from each choice trial accumulate from one trial to the next, and
only become available to the animal after it has completed a fixed number of trials. We hypothesized that this would
reduce impulsiveness because it removes the advantage of quickly realizing food gains. Clumping refers to situation in which the animal experiences several choice trials in quick succession followed by a long pause before the next
clump. We hypothesized that if payoffs accumulated over a clump of trials this would enhance the effect of accumulation. We tested the effects of accumulation and clumping on impulsiveness in a self-control situation. We found a significant interaction between clumping and accumulation. Payoff accumulation reduced impulsiveness, but only when
trials were clumped. Post hoc analyses suggest that clumping alone increases impulsiveness. A second experiment applied these results to cooperation. This experiment reveals an interaction between payoff accumulation and trial’s position within the clump. Jays were more likely to cooperate on the first trial of a clump, but the likelihood of cooperation dropped after the first trial. However, this drop was larger when payoffs did not accumulate. This observation
suggests that the difference between accumulated and unaccumulated treatments that we reported previously (Science
198: 2216–2218) may be largely due to differences in how animals behave in the first trial of a clump.
Keywords: impulsivity, cooperation, choice, temporal clumping, payoff accumulation, prisoner’s dilemma

sive animals prefer immediate rewards, strong impulsiveness may present a significant barrier to cooperation.
Beyond this theoretical link, there is an intriguing empirical parallel between impulsiveness and cooperation. In both
topics, human and non-human results disagree. Experiments
suggest that non-human animals are much more impulsive
than humans (Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 1991; Richards et
al., 1997), and much less likely to cooperate in experimental
games (Clements and Stephens, 1995; Sally, 1995). This correlation agrees with our predictions: subjects that are more
impulsive should be less cooperative (see Harris and Madden, 2002 for evidence of this correlation in human subjects).
However, we must view this correlation with some caution
because human and non-human studies use quite different
procedures (Jackson and Hackenberg, 1996).

1. Introduction
Animals show impulsiveness when they prefer an immediate food reinforcer even though a more delayed alternative
yields a higher rate of food intake. This preference for immediacy could have important implications for behavioral
models of cooperation, like the famous Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, which focus on situations in which defecting (that
is, not cooperating) leads to an immediate gain. Indeed some
workers have argued that exhibiting self-control rather than
impulsiveness is almost identical to cooperating rather than
defecting (Platt, 1973; Rachlin, 2000, 2002). To cooperate in
situations like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, animals must forego
the immediate temptation to defect in anticipation of a larger
stream of gains in the long run. Since, by definition, impul29
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Our goal was to investigate the idea that strong impulsiveness in animals prevents cooperation in experimental Prisoner’s Dilemmas. To test this, one would like some
manipulation or treatment that switches impulsiveness off.
With such a treatment, we should be able to show that animals cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma when we experimentally “switch off” their impulsiveness, but defect otherwise. The difficulty here is that we know relatively little
about the causes of impulsiveness, although the literature
gives several examples of impulsiveness varying across
contexts in both humans and non-humans (Mazur, 1994;
Mischel et al., 1989; Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens
and McLinn, 2003; Wilson and Daly, 2004). A manipulation
that should, in theory, have a large effect on impulsiveness is
payoff accumulation (Stephens, 2000).

ventional impulsiveness test. This experiment offered subjects a choice between a small immediate and a large delayed
option using an experimental situation that psychologists
call the self-control paradigm.
Experiment 2 applied the results of experiment 1 to cooperation by testing blue jays in an experimental Prisoner’s Dilemma with and without accumulation. We reported
the main effects of accumulation on cooperation elsewhere
(Stephens et al., 2002). Here, we focus on patterns related to
clumping that we have not reported previously.

1.1. Accumulation

The apparatus used in both experiments had two side-byside compartments, each shaped like a “V” (Figure 1A). Each
compartment was equipped with three perches, one in the
rear and two in the front. Each perch was positioned immediately below a stimulus light (Med Associates ENV-124AM)
that could display any of several colors. A microswitch connected to each perch allowed the experimental program to
detect the presence or absence of a bird. Generally speaking, the subject waited on the rear perch when the associated
rear light illuminated, and hopped forward to make a choice
when the front lights illuminated.
The front panel of each compartment was also equipped
with a food cup, a 20-mg pellet feeder (Med Associates ENV203- 20), and a custom-made device that we call the accumulator (Figure 1B). The accumulator was a small box made of
transparent plastic. The pellet dispenser delivered pellets
into the accumulator so that the subject could see the food
pellets it had earned but not consume them. At experimentally determined times, a flap on the bottom of the accumulator opened (by energizing a solenoid), delivering food into
the food cup. The accumulator allowed us to create treatments in which food accumulated, seen but unavailable,
over several trials, or unaccumulated treatments in which
the apparatus dispensed food immediately at the end of a
trial.

In a typical choice experiment, an animal makes a choice and
receives the benefits of its decision, and this pattern of choice
and reward continues over many trials. Imagine instead that
the benefits of each choice accumulate over a sequence of
trials, becoming available for collection only after the subject completes four trials (for example). If impulsiveness occurs because more immediate reinforcers are more valuable,
then payoff accumulation should reduce or eliminate impulsiveness because it eliminates the advantage of immediacy.
There should be no advantage to choosing the more immediate option because the subject must wait for all its accumulated gains. We present two experimental studies that
explore the potential of accumulation to influence impulsiveness. The first experiment directly asks whether accumulation reduces impulsiveness, and the second asks whether accumulation increases cooperativeness.
1.2. Clumping
When we say that the bushes in a garden are clumped, we
mean that several bushes are clustered together and clearly
separated from other clumps. By analogy, this paper refers to events that are clumped in time. When events are
clumped in time, groups of events occur in quick succession, but relatively long intervals separate one group from
another. We reasoned that if some process created temporal clumps of trials, this would make accumulation more evident to the subjects, and possibly enhance accumulation’s effect on impulsivity. The rationale of this claim is that when
trials are clumped and accumulated the subject experiences a
quick sequence of trials separated by a long interval, collecting reinforcement after every clump of trials. The long gap
between clumps should make it easier to recognize clumps
of trials, and we reason that it may also make it easier to recognize that payoff accumulation combines the benefits derived from these clumps. In contrast, if accumulated trials
were equally spaced in time, this may blur the distinction between one set of accumulated trials and the next, and so possibly reduce the effect of accumulation. Our first experiment
factorially combined accumulated and unaccumulated treatments with clumped and unclumped treatments using a con-

2. General methods
2.1. Double-V apparatus

2.2. Training
Before testing subjects in either experiment, we trained them
to perform a task we call “light following.” In light following, the subjects waited on the rear perch for a fixed time,
then hopped forward to the front perch associated with an illuminated stimulus light. Each training trial presented only
one of the two front perches, and the order of left and right
presentations was selected randomly. During this training,
we trained the subject to visit both the left and right perches.
This training used conventional shaping techniques, and
typically took 3–4 weeks to complete.
Subjects spent 23 h in the apparatus, obtaining all of their
food there. We removed the subjects from the apparatus for
1 h each day (11:00–12:00). During this break, we weighed
the subjects, and cleaned and tested the apparatus. Experimental contingencies were in force 8 h per day: starting at
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Figure 1. (A) Plan of apparatus. The
apparatus consisted of side-by-side
V-shaped compartments. Each compartment had three perches and three
stimulus projectors. (B) The accumulator. To create accumulated and unaccumulated treatments, we fixed a
transparent box to the front of each
compartment as shown here. A standard pellet dispenser delivered food
into this box. In accumulated treatments, pellets accumulated in the box
over several trials until we energized
a solenoid that opened a flap at the
bottom of the accumulator.

07:00, stopping for the break at 11:00, starting again at 12:00
and ending for the day 16:00. All stimulus lights were dark
during the periods when contingencies were not in force. We
provided supplementary food (at 16:00 daily) for any bird
that obtained less than 7 g during the day. A white noise
generator provided masking noise whenever the experimental contingencies were in force.

2.3. Statistical methods
Both experiments followed a within-subjects or repeated
measures design. To assess effects of time, we divided the
free trials into three time blocks – i.e., first third of the data,
second third, third third – and analyzed the proportional
choice for each third. When a plot or analysis called for a
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single measure of performance, we used the data from the
last third of free trials for a given treatment. We used conventional repeated measures ANOVA using arcsine transformed choice proportions to analyze the data.
3. Experiment 1
The goal of this experiment was to determine whether and
under what conditions accumulation and the temporal arrangement of trials influence blue jay preferences for immediacy. The experiment followed the self-control procedure typically used in discounting studies (e.g., Rachlin and
Green, 1972). In self-control studies, subjects must choose between a small-immediate benefit and a large-delayed benefit.
3.1. Experiment 1—Methods
3.1.1. Overview
The sequence of events within a trial was as follows: (1) the
subject waited for a fixed time (the inter-trial interval or ITI);
(2) the apparatus offered a choice between small-immediate
and large-delayed options by illuminating lights of different
colors at the front of the apparatus; (3) the subject chose one
of the options by hopping forward to the associated perch.
Once the subject made its choice, the unchosen light was
switched off and the experimentally programmed delay to
food began; (4) when the programmed delay expired, the apparatus dispensed food and the process began again at step
1. In this experiment, the small-immediate option offers one
20 mg food pellet and the large-delayed option offers three
20 mg food pellets. The delays varied according to experimental treatments as described below.
3.1.2. Subjects
The subjects in experiment 1 were six adult blue jays of unknown sex and mixed experimental histories: band numbers
b70, b85, b108, b223, b229 and b239.
3.1.3. Stimulus colors
We selected the light colors associated with small-immediate
and large-delayed randomly for each subject from the set:
yellow/ blue, blue/yellow, green/red and red/green. We
maintained this association for each subject throughout the
experiment.
3.1.4. Treatments
We organized trials into blocks of 32, the first eight trials within each block were forced or “no choice” trials in
which the subjects was offered only one option (i.e., either
the small-immediate option or the large-delayed option, but
not both). The remaining 24 trials were free choice trials, in
which subjects could choose between the two options.
3.1.5. Baseline treatments
In order to minimize order effects, each individual experienced a baseline treatment before being tested in each
clumping/accumulation combination. We designed the
baseline treatment to be intermediate between the actual experimental treatments. The delay-to-large was 60 s and the
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delay-to-small was 25 s. Within this treatment, subjects experienced a random mix of all four of the accumulation/
clumping combinations. At the beginning of each set of four
trials, the baseline program randomly determined whether
the next four trials would be: (a) clumped or not and (b) accumulated or not. In clumped trials, the subject waited 285 s
before being presented with a succession of four trials, one 5
s after the other. In non-clumped trials, the subject waited 75
s between each of the four trials. Subjects experienced 4 days
of these baseline trials before starting each new clumping/
accumulation combination.
3.1.6. Clumping treatments
We arranged trials into groups of four (within the blocks of
32 discussed above). In temporally “clumped” treatments,
the subject experienced a 345 s inter-trial interval between
clumps and then experienced a quick succession of four trials, with a 5 s inter-trial intervals, totaling four trials every
360 s. In unclumped trials, the subject waited 90 s between
each trial, again experiencing four trials every 360 s. Expressing this another way, the inter-trial interval varied in
clumped treatments (sometimes 5 s and sometimes 345 s),
but was fixed in unclumped treatments (always 360 s).
3.1.7. Accumulation treatments
In accumulated treatments, food remained in the accumulator – visible to the subject, but unavailable – for four trials,
then the accumulator opened delivering food immediately
after the fourth trial was completed. In unaccumulated treatments, the accumulator opened immediately after the pellet
dispenser delivered the last pellet of food.
3.1.8. Delay treatments
To assess whether our manipulations influenced the blue
jays’ sensitivity to delay we needed to vary the delays associated with large (three 20 mg food pellets) and small (one
20 mg food pellet) options. Therefore, we tested each clumping/accumulation combination at six different delay-tolarge/delay-to-small combinations. We tested two delays-tolarge (45 and 75 s) and three delays-to-small (5, 15 and 30
s). Each subject, therefore, experienced 24 distinct treatments
(two levels of accumulation, two levels of clumping, two levels of delay-to-large and three levels of delay-to-small). Each
subject experienced the four accumulation/ clumping treatments in a randomly determined order. In addition, we randomized the order of the six delay treatments within each
accumulation/clumping treatment, so that a given individual experienced all six delay treatments within a given level
of accumulation and clumping before moving on to the next,
randomly determined, accumulation/clumping combination. Each treatment ran for 3 days.
3.2. Experiment 1—Results
Figure 2 shows an overview of the data. The figure shows
proportional choice of the large-delayed alternative called
P(Large) in the figure, for each bird and each condition of
the experiment. It is somewhat difficult to see the patterns
in the data in this graph, but one does see considerable individual variability in the data. For example, we see that all in-
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Figure 2. Overview of experiment 1. Each panel
shows the relative frequency with which the subject choose the large-delayed alternative [denoted
by P(Large)] for each of six
subjects as a function of the
delay to small. These plots
show P(Large) calculated
from the final third of free
trials for each treatment. The
eight separate panels each
show a different combination of delay to large (45 or
75 s), clumping (clumped or
not clumped) and accumulation (accumulated or not
accumulated).

dividuals are nearly indifferent in the “clumped and accumulated” treatment, while there is much more variability in
other treatments. We also see that indifference (P(Large) =
0.5) represents an upper bound in the data; when a subject
shows a strong preference, it is a preference for the small-immediate option.
Repeated measures analysis of variance on accumulation, clumping, delay-to-small and delay-to-large treatments
shows two significant effects: a significant accumulation–
clumping interaction (F1,5 = 9.9, p = 0.025) and a significant
effect of delay-to-small (F2,10 = 6.87, p = 0.025).
Figure 3 shows the pattern of the clumping-accumulation
interaction. The “clumped and not accumulated” treatment
shows a significant shift toward choice of the small-immediate option (i.e. small P(Large)); while accumulation clearly
makes no difference when trials are unclumped. The “accumulated and clumped” appears to be slightly elevated but
further analyses suggest that this is not significant. Post hoc
analysis show significant differences between the “clumped
and not accumulated” treatment and all others, but no differences between the three remaining treatments. In addition, we observed a trend for an accumulation main effect
(F1,5 = 5.4, p = 0.067), but we focus on the significant interaction demonstrating how clumping modulates accumulation
Figure 4 shows the significant main effect of delay-to-small;
large delays-to-small increase proportional choice of the
large-delayed option (P(Large)). It is somewhat surprising
that we did not find an effect of the logically similar treatment variable delay-to-large, but the range of delay-to-large
values tested here might have been too small.

When trials were clumped trials in time, subjects may
have made different choices on the first and fourth trials
within a clump. To account for this effect, we recalculated
our analysis of variance including “clump position” as a factor. This analysis shows no effect of a trial’s position within a
clump. A graph of P(Large) versus clump position shows no
hint of a trend. We report this negative result because experiment 2 shows a striking effect of clump position.

Figure 3. An interaction plot showing the combined effects of clumping and accumulation. The whiskers show standard errors. Repeated
measures analysis of variance showed that this interaction was significant (F1,5 = 9.9, p = 0.025). As in Figure 2, this plot summarizes data
from the final third of free trails for each treatment.
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Figure 4. The significant effect of delay-to-small in experiment 1. Preference for the large-delayed option [P(Large)] increased when we increased the delay associated with the small option (F2,10 = 6.87, p =
0.025). As in previous figures, this plot summarizes data from the final
third of free trails for each treatment.

The interaction between accumulation and temporal
clumping is very intriguing (Figure 3). We introduced accumulation treatments because we hypothesized that they
would reduce impulsiveness, and indeed, we found that
blue jays were less likely to choose the small-immediate option in accumulated treatments, but only when we clumped
trials in time. Our results suggest that clumping increases
impulsiveness and accumulation reverses this effect. The
reader should recall that we conduct our studies at a longer
time scale than typical non-human studies of impulsiveness
and self-control. For example, in our unclumped treatment
subjects experienced a 90 s inter-trial interval for each trial
over an 8 h period.
3.3. Experiment 1—Discussion
This unexpected role of temporal clumping is significant in
several ways. First, temporal clumping is a new factor in
studies of impulsivity. Variables such as the overall delay to
reward are analogous to clumping in that they influence the
temporal arrangement of benefits (e.g., Rachlin and Green,
1972). Although earlier studies of impulsiveness have implicated similar variables, they focus on the temporal properties of the alternatives offered (see, for example, Bateson and
Kacelnik, 1996; Green, 2000; Mazur and Logue, 1978; Mazur et al., 1985). To create clumps, we varied the temporal
arrangement of the choices, while holding the delays and
amounts associated with each alternative fixed. Indeed, a
long-standing claim of the self-control literature is that the
duration of the inter-trial interval (the time between choices)
does not affect impulsiveness (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996;
Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000). We achieve clumping, obviously
enough, by varying the inter-trial intervals. In unclumped
treatments, inter-trial intervals are always the same, while
inter-trial intervals are sometimes short and sometimes long
in clumped treatments. So, our results suggest that variability in the inter-trial interval may affect impulsiveness, even if
the magnitude of the inter-trial interval does not. Although
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the generality of our clumping result needs further investigation, we think it worth asking whether the short sessions
of typical self-control studies may represent “clumps” that
enhance impulsiveness. If so, this might partially explain
why non-human subjects seem so absurdly impulsive.
Our clumped treatments raise questions about how one
should calculate the intake rates; since the rate per trial varies from one trial to the next. The general discussion addresses this question, and reviews relevant literature from
behavioral ecology.
Many experimental studies have investigated animal impulsiveness. These studies have emphasized the properties of
the alternatives that the experiment offers the animal. For example, an important sequence of studies shows that increasing both delays (the delay-to-small and delay-to-large) by
the same amount shifts preference toward the larger, more
delayed alternative (Green et al., 1981; Rachlin and Green,
1972). This preference reversal effect is one of the fundamental facts of animal impulsiveness. Similarly, several authors
have compared randomly varying delays to fixed delays with
the same mean duration (Mazur, 1989; Rachlin et al., 2000). In
these experiments, animals show a preference for variable delays. Students of impulsiveness see this as further evidence
that a decreasing concave-up function governs the subjective
value of delayed food. The clumping variable that we explore
here is unusual because it is not a property of the alternatives
themselves. Instead clumping refers to the arrangement of alternatives in time. There has been comparatively little work
on how such aspects of the “background” influence subjective choice. Indeed, the literature gives the overall impression
that any “background” effects on choice and impulsiveness
are virtually non-existent. One exception to this is Mazur’s
(1994) demonstration that dispensing food between choices
(i.e., within the inter-trial interval) shifts choice toward the
small-immediate alternative. Our result shows a similar shift,
but it is not clear that our clumping treatments represent
background enrichment because the average long-term rate
of intake is the same in clumped and unclumped treatments
(see general discussion for review of rate calculations). Our
results may be similar to Mazur’s background enrichment effect if we assume that variability in the temporal arrangement
of the background (clumping) increases the value of the background in the same way that variability in delays to food delivery makes alternatives in the foreground more attractive.
We remark, however, that our clumped treatments represent deterministic rather than stochastic variation in the background of a particular pair of alternatives.
Payoff accumulation superficially resembles reward bundling (Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003; Brunner and Gibbon,
1995; Mazur, 1986; Mitchell and Rosenthal, 2003). In bundling studies, a single choice leads to multiple delayed rewards, for example, a pecking a green key might lead to two
pellets after 10 s followed by an additional two pellets after an additional 10 s. In accumulation, in contrast, subjects
make a sequence of decisions that combine to influence the
magnitude and timing of a single delayed reward. Qualitatively, bundling and accumulation appear to have similar
effects in that they can both shift choice away from smaller
more immediate options (Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003).
Quantitatively, we have much more information about bun-
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dling, where evidence suggests that the discounted value
of a sequence of rewards is simply of the sum of their separately discounted values (e.g., Brunner and Gibbon, 1995;
Mazur, 1986). It is less clear how one would apply discounting models to the many actions, one outcome case posed by
accumulation.
4. Experiment 2
4.1. Overview
We designed this experiment to study the interaction between discounting and opponent strategy in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Experiment 1 showed that accumulation increased proportional choice of a large-delayed option when
trials are clumped. We, therefore, used accumulation as a
manipulation of impulsiveness. To manipulate strategies,
we assigned one individual in each pair to act as a stooge.
The stooge was trained to simply “follow lights” and in doing so it could be made to follow an experimentally determined strategy. In this experiment, the stooges either reciprocated using the widely known tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981) or unilaterally defected using the “all
defect” (All-D). A player using tit-for-tat copies his opponent’s move on the previous trial: so if my opponent cooperated on trial 10, I will cooperate on trial 11.
4.2. Experiment 2—methods
4.2.1. Subjects
The subjects were eight pairs of adult blue jays (16 birds total). In an effort to maintain similar levels of motivation, we
chose birds with similar body weights for each pair. We randomly designated one member of the pair as the “subject”
and another as the “stooge.” The pairs in this experiment
(listed subject first) were: b22 and b18, b24 and b84, b70 and
b1, b85 and b140, b122 and b3, b223 and b106, b229 and b130,
b239 and b208. In referring to the pairs, we cite only the subject’s band number.
4.2.2. A single trial
To begin, we describe the sequence of events within a single
trial, or play of the game. The computer illuminated the rear
lights at the beginning of each trial, signaling that a new trial
had started. When both subjects occupied the corresponding
rear perches, the rear lights were “washed out” (by switching on an additional white light) to indicate the beginning of
the intertrial interval. When the inter-trial interval expired,
the apparatus illuminated the subject’s front lights, indicating that a choice (or play) had become available. The appropriate front light (as determined by the programmed strategy) for the stooge illuminated at the same time. The trial
only proceeded to this choice phase if both individuals occupied their rear perches. Next, both birds hopped forward to
one of the front perches; the apparatus extinguished the unchosen light and “washed out” the chosen light (as described
above). Once both birds occupied their front perches, the apparatus dispensed food according to experimentally determined game matrices.

4.2.3. Game matrices
During tests, the subject experienced the following Prisoner’s Dilemma game matrix:

Stooge
Subject
C
D

C

D

4 Pellets
6 Pellets

0 Pellets
2 Pellets

Students of game theory usually think of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game as model of cooperation, so they customarily called one action “cooperate” (denoted by C in the game
matrix) and the other option “defect” (meaning “not cooperate,” denoted by D).
The game matrix shows how the subject’s payoffs depend on the combined actions of the subject and the stooge.
For example, if the stooge plays D and the subject plays
C the subject obtains zero pellets (see Mesterton-Gibbons,
1992 for a review of the game matrix and other ideas from
game theory). During all trials, the stooge experienced a behaviorally neutral game matrix in which it obtained two
pellets for all possible combinations of actions. The reason for this was two-fold. First, it was an effort to maximize our control over the stooge’s behavior by offering the
stooge the same motivation to act in all circumstances. Second, the stooge would then obtain slightly less food on average than the subject, which again was an effort to ensure
that the stooge was at least as motivated to act as the subject. We wanted to avoid situations, for example, in which
the stooge was satiated (and so had a high latency to act),
while the subject was still hungry.
4.2.4. Mutualism precedes Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game theoretical equilibria are stability concepts. To test the
stability of cooperation, we sought to first create high levels
of cooperation. To achieve this, we presented each subject
with a mutualism matrix given by:
Stooge
Subject
C
D

C

D

4
0

2
0

which quickly led to high levels of the C response. Subjects
experienced this mutualism treatment before each Prisoner’s
Dilemma test, for a minimum of 3 days, terminating only
when the subject showed 80% C or higher for two consecutive days.
Following the results of experiment 1, we arranged all
trials into clumps of four. The birds waited 345 s and then
played four times in quick succession with 5 s between
plays. In addition, we arranged trials in blocks of 40 (10
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clumps of 4), with 8 forced or no choice trials followed by 32
free choice trials. During the forced choice trials, the apparatus presented only one option to the subjects (either or C or
D), while the stooge continued to play its programmed strategy (TFT or All-D).
As explained above, the C and D choices were defined by
their positions. The C choice was the perch closest to the opponent, while the D choice was further away. In addition,
we changed the color of the stimulus light associated with
C and D for each accumulation/strategy treatment. We used
four color pairs — yellow/red, yellow/blue, red/green and
green/orange — chosen because they seemed about equally
discriminable to a human observer. We randomized the
color pair used for each subject in each treatment, assigning
one of the two colors to C and the other to D. The stooge’s
choice light was always green.
4.2.5. Stooge strategy treatments
As described above, the stooge implemented a strategy that
we determined. We simply programmed the apparatus so
that the appropriate choice (C or D) was the only one available to the stooge. For example, in tit-for-tat we programmed
the apparatus to show the inside C light if the subject cooperated on the previous trial, and to show the outside D light
if the subject defected on the previous trial. The appropriate payoff matrix (mutualism or Prisoner’s Dilemma) determined the subject’s payoffs, just as if the stooge had chosen freely. When there were long programmed gaps between
plays, such as from 1 day to the next, or over the mid-day
break, the tit-for-tat player began by cooperating.
4.2.6. Accumulation treatments
In accumulated treatments, the apparatus held food in the
transparent accumulator (Figure 1B) for a clump of four trials, while in non-accumulated treatments the flapper was
opened at the end of each trial, immediately after the pellet
dispenser operated.
4.2.6.1. General plan of a treatment. The general plan of a single
treatment is straightforward. First, we randomly assigned
stimulus colors, stooge strategy and accumulation treatment.
Second, the subject experienced the mutualism matrix (with
the chosen accumulation and stooge-strategy treatments in
force) until the cooperation criterion was satisfied. Third,
we changed the subject’s payoff matrix to the Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix, and this was in force until the subject completed 1000 free choice trials (5–7 days). We repeated this cycle until each subject had completed all four accumulation/
strategy combinations. In a few cases, a subject completed
less than 1000 free trials (never less than 700 free trials) because of an error in the program that managed the transitions from one treatment to the next.
4.3. Experiment 2—results
Experiment 2 considered the effect of accumulation and
strategy on the stability of cooperation, and we published
the main results on this topic previously (Stephens et al.,
2002). This paper emphasizes unpublished results on the effect of temporal clumping, but we review the earlier results
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because they lay the groundwork for our clumping results.
The basic result of the experiment was a three-way interaction between opponent strategy, accumulation and time
block. This interaction showed that cooperation persisted
when the opponent reciprocated (played tit-for-tat) and payoffs accumulated; in contrast, cooperation eroded toward defection in other situations.
As explained in the methods, our procedure clumped trials (“plays” in game-theoretic jargon) together in time because experiment 1 showed that clumping enhanced the
effect of accumulation on impulsiveness. Here, we ask
whether subjects cooperate more on the first play of clump
or on the second and so on. In this re-analysis, therefore, we
conducted a large repeated measures analysis of variance,
similar to the one used to analyze previously published data,
except that we added “clump position” as a fixed factor. Table 1 shows the resulting ANOVA table. The table shows
the same pattern of significant and insignificant results as
in our earlier published analysis, but also shows two significant effects that involve position within the clump: a significant main effect of clump position and a significant interaction of accumulation and clump position (codes ACCUM
and CLMP-POS). Figure 5 shows the accumulation–position interaction. The figure shows that subjects cooperate at
roughly the same level in the first play of a clump regardless of whether payoffs are accumulated or not accumulated.
However, the level of cooperation drops on the second, third
and fourth plays of the clump in both treatments; however,
this drop is larger in the unaccumulated treatments. A post
hoc analysis using Fisher’s least-significance difference tests
at the 5% level of significance suggests that the clump positions 2–4 in the unaccumulated treatments are a distinct subset of the data with markedly lower levels of cooperation.
The figure suggests a similar but more subtle decline in accumulated treatments, but post hoc analysis suggests this is not

Figure 5. The significant accumulation/clump position interaction
(F3,21 = 7.83, p = 0.0011) observed in experiment 2. The plot shows the
relative frequency of cooperation as a function of a trial’s position
within a clump of plays (clump position). Subjects cooperated at relatively high rates in the first trial of a clump, but the frequency of cooperation declined markedly on later trials in “Not Accumulated” treatments. In “Accumulated” treatments, the frequency of cooperation
did not drop significantly on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th trials of the clump.
As in previous figures, this plot summarizes data from the final third
of free trails for each treatment.
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Table 1. Repeated measures analysis of variance table of experiment 2
Source
Strategy (STRAT)
Error
Accumulation (ACCUM)
Error
Time block (BLOCK)
Error
Clump position (CLMP-POS)
Error
STRAT×ACCUM
Error
STRAT×BLOCK
Error
ACCUM×BLOCK
Error
STRAT×CLMP-POS
Error
ACCUM×CLMP-POS
Error
BLOCK×CLMP-POS
Error
STRAT×ACCUM×BLOCK
Error
STRAT×ACCUM×CLMP-POS
Error
STRAT×BLOCK×CLMP-POS
Error
ACCUM×BLOCK×CLMP-POS
Error
STRAT×ACCUM×BLOCK×CLMP-POS
Error

d.f.

MS

F

19.0705

1

19.0705

71.6912

0.000063*

1.8621

7

0.2660

2.1183

1

2.1183

5.1324

0.057862

2.8891

7

0.4127

4.4122

2

2.2061

68.7237

0.000000*

0.4494

14

0.0321

2.2671

3

0.7557

11.4228

0.000118*

1.3893

21

0.0662

0.0746

1

0.0746

0.2845

0.610253

1.8350

7

0.2621

1.3544

2

0.6772

44.6636

0.000001*

0.2123

14

0.0152

0.2291

2

0.1145

1.6284

0.231290

0.9848

14

0.0703

0.0884

3

0.0295

0.6735

0.577858

0.9183

21

0.0437

0.4376

3

0.1459

7.8305

0.001076*

0.3912

21

0.0186

0.0611

6

0.0102

2.0523

0.079710

0.2086

42

0.0050

0.3225

2

0.1613

4.2382

0.036377*

0.5327

14

0.0380

0.0792

3

0.0264

1.7342

0.190686

0.3199

21

0.0152

0.0482

6

0.0080

1.6587

0.155185

0.2033

42

0.0048

0.0403

6

0.0067

0.6974

0.653061

0.4049

42

0.0096

0.0327

6

0.0055

1.0398

0.413598

0.2204

42

0.0052

Sum of squares

significant. Overall, this new analysis including the effects of
clump position, suggests shows that the overall difference in
cooperation we reported previously is largely due to differences that occur after the first play of a clump.
We find that subjects cooperate more frequently after the
long interval between clumps than after the short interval
within clumps, and the drop in cooperation from the first to
second play is greatest when we distribute payoffs immediately. We do not have a convincing explanation for this result, but we can offer two plausible interpretations. One
possibility is that subjects simply forget their place in the
intervals between clumps of plays, and this causes them to
fall back to typical behavior, which tends to increase cooperation. Recall that our procedures start each treatment with
high levels of cooperation, so that subjects have had more
overall experience choosing the “C” option than the “D” option—therefore, forgetful subjects might return to the previously reinforced “C” option. The subject needs the first
play in a clump to “jog” its memory before it begins to respond appropriately to the opponent on the second play.
In this view, the salience of actually receiving food in unac-
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cumulated treatments jog the subject’s memory more effectively than the visible but unavailable food deliveries of the
accumulated treatments. The explanation works best for the
tit-for-tat treatments, since it is somewhat unclear how a jay
can “lose its place” in the all defect treatments where they
should always defect as their opponent does.
The second possibly relies on game theory. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it can never be rational to cooperate when
only one play remains, by extension game theorists have
long argued that if two players know they will play a fixed
number of times they should always defect (see MestertonGibbons, 1992 for a complete discussion). So a second possibility is that subjects view the clumps of four plays like a finitely repeated game, in which they “know” they will play
the game exactly four times. To explain a shift to defection
within a clump of plays, we assume that a subject’s certainty
about how many plays remain depends on the position of
a trial in the clump. Psychophysics (e.g., Gescheider, 1985)
tells us that the more plays remain, the more unsure the subjects should be. Therefore, we would expect fairly confident
defection on the last play of a clump. Intuitively the idea is
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that subjects “care about” the four-play future of an interaction at the beginning of a clump of plays, but do not care
at all on the last play. This hypothesis does not explain the
stepwise transition from the first to second plays as neatly as
the forgetting hypothesis, although the forgetting hypothesis, at best, explains only some aspects of our results.
4.4. Experiment 2—Discussion
Experiment 2 explored the role of accumulation and strategy
in cooperation, and found – as previously reported – that cooperation persisted in treatments where payoffs accumulated and the opponent reciprocated. This paper shows that
subjects cooperated most in the first play of a clump with a
distinct drop in levels of cooperation after this when payoff
did not accumulate. The effects of accumulation on cooperation are due to differences that occur in the second, third and
fourth plays of a clump. As in experiment 1, we see that temporal clumping plays an unexpected role in determining the
level of cooperation.
4.4.1. Clumps and cooperation
Our demonstration that cooperativeness varies with the position of a play within a sequence of clumped plays adds a
new level of complexity to models of cooperation. Theoretical approaches to cooperation in social dilemmas typically
ignore the temporal organization of plays (see Stephens,
2000; Stephens et al., 1995 for exceptions). For example, modelers have advocated a great many strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (tit-for- tat, generous tit-for-tat, Pavlov and so
on), but none of these strategies considers the temporal aspects of cooperative games. Moreover, we comment that naturally occurring cooperative situations will be organized in
time in many different ways. Some may have a clear bout
structure, with bouts of play separated by long interval of
non-play (e.g., two male manakins repeatedly dance for a
female, but then wait a long time for the next female to arrive). Others may have no specific temporal clumping, but
have opportunities to play occurring randomly. The evenly
spaced structure of repeated play tacitly assumed by most
models of cooperation is perhaps the least likely possibility.
Our results suggest that these arrangements may have important effects on the behavioral control of cooperation.
We find that cooperation is a rather fragile phenomenon
(Stephens et al., 2002). We had to construct rather specialized
circumstances to generate cooperative behavior. To circumvent the problem of impulsiveness, we had to both clump trials and accumulate payoffs. In addition, the jays had to play
against strict TFT strategists. Although our clumped/accumulated design does model some natural cooperative situations, it does not reflect all instances of cooperation. These
experiments suggest that cognitive constraints such as impulsivity may limit the role of reciprocity as a general mechanism of cooperation (Stevens and Hauser, 2004).
5. General discussion
We have considered the combined effects of payoff accumulation and temporal clumping on impulsiveness and coop-
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eration. Our first experiment shows that subjects were less
impulsive when payoffs accumulated, but only when we arranged trials in clumps. We expected accumulation to reduce impulsiveness and reasoned that clumping would enhance this effect. Instead, our data suggest that clumping
increases impulsiveness and accumulation eliminates the effect of clumping because jays were most impulsive in our
clumped and unaccumulated treatment but about equally
impulsive in all other treatments.
5.1. Calculating long-term rates
The first sentence of this paper defines impulsivity in terms
of rate. We characterize an animal’s behavior as impulsive
if it chooses a smaller more immediate option even when a
larger more delayed option yields a higher long-term rate.
Our clumped treatments raise questions about the meaning
of “long-term rate” that do not arise in “unclumped” studies of impulsivity. Consider a self-control experiment that offers an animal a choice between a small-immediate option,
yielding amount A1 after delay t1, and large-delayed option, yielding amount A2 after delay t2. In addition, the subject waits for inter-trial interval τ between trials. The conventional way to calculate the highest long-term rate is to
compare:
A2
A1
and
τ + t1
τ + t2
For a situation with evenly-space trials, the quantity Ai /
(τ + ti) is the rate calculated from one choice point to the next
(the “choice-to-choice” rate) and the infinite time-horizon
rate (the really “long-term” rate). However, if the inter-trial
interval varies as it does in our clumped treatments, then
the choice-to-choice rate and the long-term rate are not the
same. In our clumped treatments, with clumps of four trials,
the inter-trial interval for the first trial is 345 s, followed by
three very short inter-trial intervals of 5 s. So the choice-tochoice rate for the first trial in a clump is Ai /(345 + ti), while
the choice-to-choice rate for the second trial in a clump is Ai
/(5 + ti), but the long-term rate is necessarily the same for
all trials. The long-term rate is Ai /(90 + ti) because the average inter-trial interval is 90 s, 1/4 × 345 + 3/4 × 5 = 90. We
designed our study so that the long-term rates, measured in
this sense, were the same in our clumped and unclumped
treatments.
We comment that one can calculate a different average
rate using a weighted average of the choice-to-choice rates:
1/4 × Ai /(345 + ti) + 3/4 × Ai /(5 + ti). Most students of
feeding behavior now agree, however, that averaging the
time and amount components separately and then calculating the quotient of the averages gives a more meaningful estimate of the long-term rate. Specifically this quotient of the
averages measures the rate of gain in a typical unit of time,
while the weighted average of choice-to-choice rates gives
the rate in a typical trial. The literature of rate-based foraging
models contains extensive discussions of these issues (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Templeton and Lawlor, 1981; Turelli et al., 1982), but there seems
to have been little discussion of the problems of calculating
rates in a variable world in the literature of impulsivity.
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If one accepts that long-term rates, as explained above,
provide the appropriate standard against which to recognize
impulsivity, then there can be little doubt that the observed
increase in choice of the small-immediate option in clumped
treatments represents a change in impulsivity because the alternatives in our clumped and unclumped treatments provide the same long-term rates.
Even if we agree that the long-term rate provides the correct standard of comparison for the definition of impulsivity,
a critical reader might ask whether our subjects responded
to choice-to-choice rates. This might explain the shift toward
the small-immediate option in clumped treatments because
the small-immediate option often provides a high choice-tochoice rate in clumped treatments. However, if choice-tochoice rates governed our jay’s choice behavior we should
have observed different behavior in the last trial. Specifically, we would expect preference for large-delayed in the
last trial of clump and preference for small-immediate on the
first, second and third trials. As reported above, experiment
1 found no effect of clump position on choice behavior. So, if
sensitivity to choice-to-choice rates influenced our jays, they
made a mistake by over-emphasizing the three trials that occur in quick succession and underemphasizing the long-wait
to the beginning of the next clump.
5.2. Limitations and further questions
As with any novel result, one must ask how general these
clumping effects might be. To answer this question, we need
further studies on the effects of clumping on impulsiveness. Our studies differ from most studies of impulsivity because we ran 8 h sessions and subjects obtained nearly all of
their food from the apparatus. In this procedure, a session
fills an 8 h day and trials occur on a longer time scale than
in more common open economy procedures. A clump of trials may be a more salient feature of our long sessions than
it would be in typical open-economy procedures. Assuming
for the moment that further studies validate our clumping
result, we want to know why it occurs. The hypothesis that
variability in the inter-trial interval (clumping) increases the
background value suggests several further studies. An obvious question is whether random variation in the intertrial interval has the same effect as the deterministic variation we
have studied.
Similar concerns arise in connection with the clump-position effect on cooperation that we report. It is striking that
we do not find similar clump-position effects in experiment
1, where we focused on impulsiveness and not cooperation.
Of course, a key difference between the studies is that the
stooge’s experimentally determined strategy creates sequential relationships between successive plays. Manipulations of
the stooge’s strategy and interval between clumps could be
revealing here.
5.3. Summary
We present two experiments that investigate the role of payoff accumulation and temporal clumping of trials in impulsiveness and cooperation. Our results show that clumping
makes animals more impulsive, but that payoff accumula-

39

tion can eliminate this effect. Although animal impulsiveness is a widely studied phenomenon, we believe that this
study is the first to report this clumping effect. In addition,
this clumping effect is one of only two results showing that
aspects of the choice background can influence impulsiveness. We also show that cooperativeness varies with the position of trial within a clump of trials. Taken together, these
results suggest that temporal clumping and related issues of
the temporal organization of the choices may provide important new insights into impulsiveness and cooperation.
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